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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In October of 2000, Henar Plaza-Torres was excited to begin a teaching career 
with Petra Roman Vigo School in Puerto Rico as a junior-high school mathematics 
teacher.1 A mere four months later, in February of 2001, Ms. Plaza-Torres resigned 
because she could not endure the continuous sexual harassment by two of her 
students.2 Ms. Plaza-Torres had reported the incidents of sexual harassment to her 
school administration over a two month period, but the school refused to exercise its 
authority to discipline the students and prevent their continued misbehavior.3 Ms. 
Plaza-Torres filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico, which 
alleged that the school lacked an anti-harassment policy to adequately address 
student-on-teacher sexual harassment, and that certain school officials failed to take 
appropriate remedial measures to correct the sexual harassment and hostile work 
environment that led to her constructive discharge.4 
Ms. Plaza-Torres is not alone. Unfortunately, specific studies on the prevalence 
of sexual harassment of teachers by students are limited due to the relatively recent 
recognition of the problem. By analogy, however, studies that indicate that respect 
for authority is declining among teenagers provide helpful indications of possible 
causes of the problem.5 For example, one study conducted in 1997 revealed that six 
percent of elementary school teachers, twenty-three percent of middle school 
teachers, and twenty percent of high school teachers reported experiencing verbal 
abuse from students.6 Another study conducted in 1999 revealed that “19 [sic] 
percent of [United States] public schools reported weekly student acts of disrespect 
for teachers.”7  Even these statistics may not accurately represent the rate of student-
                                                           
1Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 177 (D.P.R. 2005). 
2Id. at 175, 177. 
3Id. at 184. 
4Id. at 175. 
5Terry Nihart et al., Kids, Cops, Parents and Teachers: Exploring Juvenile Attitudes 
Toward Authority Figures, 6 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 79, 80-81 (2005); see also John O’Neil, 
Cover Story: Classroom Management, NAT’L EDUC. ASSN., Jan. 2004, http://www.nea.org/ 
neatoday/0401/cover.html (noting that public attitudes have consistently identified lack of 
discipline as one of the top concerns facing schools since 1969 when Phi Delta Kappa first 
began conducting its annual Gallop poll of public attitudes toward schools).  
6Ethics Resource Center, Statistics: Discipline Issues, http://www.ethics.org/ 
character/stats_discipline.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2006) (reporting the results of a 1997 
study on school violence, which was conducted with a nationally represented sample of 1234 
regular public elementary, middle, and secondary schools in the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia). 
7JILL F. DEVOE ET AL., U.S. DEP’TS OF EDUC. & JUSTICE, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME 
AND SAFETY: 2005 at v (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/iscs05ex.pdf; see also 
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2007] OVERCOMING A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT 579 
on-teacher harassment, as teachers may underreport harassment in order to preserve 
their dignity and their jobs.8 
Despite the prevalence of student harassment against teachers, many school 
administrators disregard teacher complaints. Inaction rarely has legal repercussions 
for schools or their administrators.9  As a result, administrators do not feel obligated 
to take action against student perpetrators to remove sexual harassment from the 
work environment of their teachers.  When school districts refuse to take appropriate 
action to protect their teachers from sexual harassment perpetrated by their students, 
teachers are forced to choose between their economic well-being and their emotional 
well-being.10 
In the past, courts have been reluctant to hold schools accountable for student-on-
teacher sexual harassment.  The United States Supreme Court has not directly ruled 
on the issue of school liability for student-on-teacher sexual harassment.11 As a 
result, teachers who have been sexually harassed by their students and who have 
brought claims against their schools for failure to intervene have struggled to survive 
summary judgment and, as a result, school districts avoid legal liability.12  There is 
                                                                                                                                         
NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY (2005), 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/crimeindicators. 
8The author bases this assumption on the apparent similarity between student-on-teacher 
sexual harassment and rape in terms of the victim’s reluctance to report out of embarrassment 
and fear. Rape is “the most underreported violent crime in America” because victims fear 
police response, minimize the importance of reporting, discredit the possibility of a favorable 
outcome, or prefer to protect their own privacy.  Rape Trauma Services, Rape and Sexual 
Assault: The Demographics of Rape, http://www.rapetraumaservices.org/rape-sexual-
assault.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2006) (citing D.G. KILPATRICK, ET AL., THE NAT’L CTR. FOR 
VICTIMS OF CRIME, RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION (1992)) (emphasis omitted).       
9Note that the U.S. Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the issue to establish a cause 
of action for teachers to assert against a school. Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d  at 180. As a 
result, many jurisdictions have been unwilling to recognize a teacher’s cause of action and 
complaints filed by victimized teachers are often dismissed on summary judgment. See, e.g., 
Seils v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 192 F. Supp. 2d 100, 113-14 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). 
10See PEGGY CRULL, WORKING WOMEN'S INST., THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON 
THE JOB: A PROFILE OF THE EXPERIENCES OF 92 WOMEN 4 (1979) (indicating that psychological 
symptoms, including fear, anger, and nervousness, affect ninety-six percent of harassment 
victims); see also Jennifer L. Vinciguerra, Note, The Present State of Sexual Harassment Law: 
Perpetuating Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Sexually Harassed Women, 42 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 301, 306 & n.39 (1994) (citing CRULL, supra note 10).    
11Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 180 (“[N]either the U.S. Supreme Court nor the First 
Circuit Court have discussed school liability for sexual harassment suffered by a teacher on 
account of a student . . . .”); Paul Lannon, School May Be Liable for Student-on-Teacher 
Harassment, Holland & Knight LLP, http://www.hklaw.com/Publications/OtherPublication. 
asp?ArticleID=3245, (last visited Nov. 23, 2007). 
12In order for a court to grant summary judgment as a matter of law, the moving party 
must prove two elements: namely, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 
evidence would lead reasonable minds to but one conclusion in favor of the moving party.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-55 (1986); see also 
Seils, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 110, 127 (granting summary judgment in favor of school district).  
But see Owen v. L’Anse Area Schs., No. 2:00-CV-71, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19287, at *10 
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some evidence, however, that the tides are shifting. Recent court treatment of 
student-on-teacher harassment indicates that the courts may be more receptive to 
teachers’ claims of sexual harassment by students.13 
A split has emerged among the lower federal courts that have faced the issue of 
school liability for student-on-teacher sexual harassment. Some jurisdictions 
continue to refuse to recognize a teacher's cause of action against a school that fails 
to prevent student-on-teacher sexual harassment.14  Recently, however, the precedent 
for analogous claims by public employees against their employers for employment 
discrimination based on sex has solidified; as a result, jurisdictions seem to be 
increasingly willing to recognize a cause of action against school districts in their 
capacity as a public employer for failure to intervene in acts of student-on-teacher 
sexual harassment.15  These jurisdictions have found that teachers who experience 
employment discrimination may bring their cause of action under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),16 which prohibits discrimination in the 
workplace based on sex, as well as race, color, religion, or national origin,17 or Title 
IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”),18 which prohibits sex 
discrimination in schools that receive federal funding.19 Most recently, in July of 
2005, the United States District Court of Puerto Rico held for the first time that a 
teacher—Ms. Plaza-Torres—could bring a cause of action, under either Title VII or 
                                                                                                                                         
(W.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 2001) (denying summary judgment for Title VII discrimination claim 
on appeal). 
13Lannon, supra note 11. 
14Seils, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 118. 
15See, e.g., Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 956 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding 
that a cause of action, under the Equal Protection Clause, against a school for sexual 
orientation harassment of a teacher by students may exist). 
1642 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 
17Peries v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. 97 CV 7109, 2001 WL 1328921, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 6, 2001) (recognizing a cause of action under Title VII against the school for race and 
national origin harassment of teacher by students; denying defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment, in order to give plaintiff the opportunity to establish for a jury that a “hostile 
environment existed and . . . that the school board either provided no reasonable avenue of 
complaint or knew of the harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action”).  For 
cases that have recognized a cause of action for student-on-teacher harassment in alternative 
contexts, see Schroeder, 282 F.3d at 956 (recognizing a cause of action under the Equal 
Protection Clause for sexual orientation harassment of a teacher by students, although the 
claim was not proper in this case); Lovell v. Comsewogue Sch. Dist., 214 F. Supp. 2d 319, 
323 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that plaintiff stated a cognizable cause of action under the Equal 
Protection Clause against the school district for failing to take appropriate measures to prevent 
sexual orientation harassment by students). 
1820 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).   
19N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 530 (1982) (extending Title IX to protect 
employees of educational institutions from sex discrimination); see also Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 
376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 179 (D.P.R. 2005) (“Title IX . . . provides protection from sex 
discrimination in employment.”); see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979). 
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Title IX, against a school district that refused to take action to prevent sexual 
harassment perpetrated by students.20 
It is essential to the safety and protection of our nation’s educators that schools 
adopt preventative and corrective measures to stop student-on-teacher sexual 
harassment. Schools should consider developing training programs devoted to 
educating the school community, revising current anti-harassment policies to 
explicitly prohibit student-on-teacher sexual harassment, and establishing effective 
complaint procedures to help victimized teachers report incidents of sexual 
harassment. By taking these proactive measures, schools will prepare themselves for 
the potential liability suggested by recent case law. 
This Note urges all school districts to take proactive measures to end sexual 
harassment of teachers by students. Additionally, it urges state legislatures to pass 
legislation mandating school adoption of anti-harassment policies that include 
provisions prohibiting all forms of student-on-teacher harassment, including sexual 
harassment. Following this introduction, Part II of this Note provides a background 
on the current climate in the public schools in the United States, identifies the 
statutory protections available to victims of sexual harassment, and discusses the 
definitions of sexual harassment used by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) and the courts. Part III examines relevant sexual harassment 
decisions in the school environment, as well as analogous sexual harassment 
decisions in the employment context. Part IV explores the court’s analysis in Plaza-
Torres v. Rey21 and considers the policy rationales for imposing liability on schools 
that refuse to intervene in incidents of student-on-teacher harassment. Part V of this 
Note recommends that school districts revise their existing anti-harassment policies 
and develop proactive training programs directed at teachers, students, parents, and 
the entire school community to prohibit student-on-teacher harassment effectively, 
increase awareness of the problem, and emphasize a commitment to strict 
disciplinary action for offenders. Finally, Part VI concludes that elimination of 
student-on-teacher sexual harassment will require proactive school administrations 
that are interested in both taking the requisite steps to protect teachers from student 
harassment and avoiding costly legal liability that could result from their inaction. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Current Climate of U.S. Schools 
Disrespect and disorder are increasingly common problems facing teachers in 
schools in the United States.22 Teachers constantly struggle to maintain order in their 
classrooms and authority over their students.23 The concerns teachers face in the 
                                                           
20Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 180-81. 
21Id. at 180-84. 
22Mary Ellen Flannery, The D Word: Discipline Problems Weigh on Educators Today 
More than ever. But Don’t Despair—there’s Plenty You Can Do to Knock Your Challenges 
Down to Size, NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N, Sept. 2005, http://www.nea.org/neatoday/0509/ 
coverstory.html (“[S]urvey found 82 percent of adults agree kids are less respectful.”). 
23O’Neil, supra note 5. 
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classroom today are quite different from fifty years ago.24 Students today become 
violent with their classmates25 and verbally or physically attack their teachers.26  In 
1999, Reb Bradley suggested that children lack the discipline and self-control 
necessary for learning in the classroom because parents no longer take the time to 
teach self-control to their children.27 Instead of teaching self-control and self-denial,28 
parents focus on being popular with their children.29 Parents are intimidated by their 
children and distracted by work and other commitments, and, as a result, children run 
the homes.30 Not surprisingly, these children expect to run their classrooms as well.31 
Consequently, conflict and tension between teachers and students arise in the 
classroom and pose problems for schoolteachers. 
Students lack the respect for teachers, parents, and other authority figures that 
society once expected and enforced.32 Some blame the decline in respectful behavior 
on violent television programs, movies, and videogames.33 Others blame weak gun 
laws,34 increased work commitments,35 or lack of after-school programs.36 Still others 
                                                           
24Nancy A. Braun et al., Establishing a Descriptive Database for Teachers with 
Aggressive Students, 8 J. BEHAV. EDUC. 457, 457 (1998) (noting the shift in the last half-
century in social issues that concern families, schools, and communities, including increased 
“poverty, suicide, drug and alcohol abuse, divorce, child abuse, weapon use, and gang 
involvement”).  
25Flannery, supra note 22; see also DEVOE ET AL., supra note 7 at vi (“In 2003, 12 percent 
of students ages 12–18 reported that someone at school had used hate-related words against 
them. . . [and] 7 percent of students ages 12–18 reported that they had been bullied . . . at 
school during the previous 6 months.”). 
26Flannery, supra note 22; see also DEVOE ET AL., supra note 7 at v (“In 1999–2000, 19 
percent of public schools reported weekly student acts of disrespect for teachers, 13 percent 
reported student verbal abuse of teachers, 3 percent reported student racial tensions, and 3 
percent reported widespread disorder in classrooms.”). 
27Reb Bradley, What’s Happened to America? The Ultimate Answer, WORLD NET DAILY, 
June 1, 1999, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=16149 (“Until 
parents get the vision for teaching their children to be self-controlled, America will continue 
its downward slide into the moral cesspool.”). 
28Self-denial refers to “practicing self discipline” and “controlling . . . impulses.” WordNet 
3.0, http://wordnet.princeton.edu (last visited Oct. 28, 2007); see also Dictionary.com, 
http://www.dictionary.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2007) (Defining self-denial as “[s]acrifice of 
one’s own desires or interests.”).   
29Bradley, supra note 27.  
30Id.  
31Id.  
32Braun, supra note 24, at 458 (“Major concerns listed in the 1940’s [sic] included talking 
without permission, chewing gum in class, making noises, running in the hallway, getting out 
of line, wearing improper clothing, and not putting paper in the wastebasket.”). 
33Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1487, 1487 (1995); see also Bradley, supra note 27.    
34Bradley, supra note 27. 
35New America Found., Workforce and Family Program, http://www.new 
america.net/programs/workforce_and_family (last visited Apr. 21, 2007) (“Nearly two-thirds 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss4/9
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blame inadequate school funding, which leads to larger school buildings, larger 
classes, and higher student-to-teacher ratios.37 Regardless of the actual cause of the 
increase in violence and disrespect among students, alleviating the problem of 
student disrespect will necessitate dedication and effort from the entire school 
community—teachers, administrators, parents, coaches, and students. 
In the 1980s, people began to recognize sexual harassment as a form of student 
disrespect.38  In 1998, the National Education Association (“NEA”)39 recognized 
sexual harassment and other acts of disrespect in the classroom and posted twenty-
five classroom management tips on their website to help teachers regain control.40  
Efforts like these are a good start toward prevention; however, violent and 
disrespectful behavior, including sexual harassment, will continue to plague the 
schools until school administrators make it a priority to consistently exercise their 
heightened authority over students who have sexually harassed their teachers.41   
B.  Statutory Protections 
1.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 as amended in 1991,43 forbids 
employment discrimination based on an “individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
                                                                                                                                         
of families are now headed by either two working parents or a single working parent.”); see 
also Parents Action for Children, Key Facts about Child Care in America, 
http://www.parentsaction.org/act/childcare/key-facts/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). 
36Kevin P. Dwyer, Children Killing Children: Strategies to Prevent Youth Violence, 
COMMUNIQUE: NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. PSYCHOLOGIST, Spring 1999, at 3, http://www. 
naspcenter.org/pdf/bbcqcrisisfamily.pdf. 
37Public Agenda, Public Agenda Report: Sizing Things Up – What Parents, Teachers, and 
Students Think About Large and Small High Schools, http://www.publicagenda.org/ 
specials/smallschools/smallschools.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2006). 
38Pam Chamberlain, 66 RADICAL TCHR. 32, 32 (2003) (book review) (“[S]exual 
harassment became recognized as prevalent in schools in the 1980s.”). 
39National Education Association, About NEA, http://www.nea.org/aboutnea/index.html 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2006). “The National Education Association (NEA), the nation's largest 
professional employee organization, is committed to advancing the cause of public education. 
NEA's 3.2 million members work at every level of education—from pre-school to university 
graduate programs. NEA has affiliate organizations in every state and in more than 14,000 
local communities across the United States.”  Id. 
40Flannery, supra note 22 (suggesting the following tips for educators: modeling desired 
behavior, setting parameters, avoiding confrontation, keeping students busy, creating more 
interesting lesson plans, ignoring excuses, going on home visits, ensuring that students and 
parents understand the rules and expectations, and finding the triggers); see also O’Neil, supra 
note 5 (indicating that teachers who are experts in managing behavior in today’s classrooms 
establish effective rules and procedures, create a supportive classroom environment, build 
strong relationships with parents and students, handle disruptions quietly while traveling the 
room, and are flexible).  
41Chamberlain, supra note 38 (“Schools tend to treat the problem [of sexual harassment in 
schools], however, as something to be hidden, a secret.”). 
4242 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 
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national origin.”44 Title VII purports to achieve equality and remove barriers in 
employment.45 The prohibition against sex discrimination means that an employee 
may not be discriminated against because of sex.46  Title VII applies to all employers 
with fifteen or more employees—including school systems—to ensure that 
employees are protected from sex discrimination in the workplace.47 
Courts have not always interpreted Title VII to protect employees from sexual 
harassment. Prior to the 1980s, many courts refused to recognize sexual harassment 
as a form of sex discrimination.48 Then, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,49 the 
United States Supreme Court established that sexual harassment is a form of sex 
discrimination and, therefore, a violation of Title VII.50 
                                                                                                                                         
43For a discussion of the effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on sexual harassment, see, 
for example, Edward J. Costello, Jr., Note, Sexual Harassment After the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, 23 UWLA L. REV. 21 (1992). 
4442 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The statute states, in pertinent part, that it is “an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id. Importantly, “[i]ts original purpose as a civil 
rights measure was to outlaw racial segregation. Sex, as a category, was added at the last 
minute as an amendment in a cynical attempt to defeat the bill altogether.” PAUL I. WEIZER, 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: CASES, CASE STUDIES, & COMMENTARY 151 (David A. Schultz ed., 
2002) (citing Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Even so, “sex-based criteria 
have developed into one of the most litigated parts of the civil rights agenda.” Id. 
45Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (“The objective of Congress in 
the enactment of Title VII . . . was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and 
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white 
employees over other employees.”). 
46Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998).  
47Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 180 (D.P.R. 2005) (“Title VII’s absolute ban 
of sex discrimination . . . is binding for all employers, regardless of whether their employer 
receives federal funding.”); see Courtney Weiner, Note, Sex Education: Recognizing Anti-Gay 
Harassment as Sex Discrimination Under Title VII and Title IX, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 189 (2005); see also Staci D. Lowell, Note, Striking a Balance: Finding a Place for 
Religious Conscience Clauses in Contraceptive Equity Legislation, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 441, 
464 (2004-2005) (“Title VII . . . applies to employers with over 15 employees . . . .”).   
48ROBERT BELTON ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 443 (7th ed. 2004). But see Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 
654, 663 (D.D.C. 1976) (recognizing sexual harassment as a cognizable cause of action under 
Title VII). 
49477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
50Id. at 65; see also Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (recognizing a 
cause of action for a discriminatory work environment for the first time); EEOC Guidelines on 
Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2006). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss4/9
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2.  Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972,51 amended in 1990,52 states in 
pertinent part that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education[al] program or activity receiving [f]ederal 
financial assistance.”53 Title IX seeks to prevent educational institutions from using 
federal funds to support discriminatory practices.54  Thus, in order to meet its 
purpose of protecting individuals from discrimination in schools, Title IX's express 
prohibition against discriminatory practices applies to sex discrimination occurring 
in federally-funded schools.55 
Originally, courts interpreted Title IX narrowly as a measure intended to protect 
students against sex discrimination at school.56 Then, in 1982, in North Haven Board 
of Education v. Bell, the United States Supreme Court extended the application of 
Title IX to provide protection to employees of federally-funded schools from 
employment discrimination.57 In North Haven,58 the Court examined the broad 
language of the statute, particularly the meaning of “person.”59 The Court also 
explored the legislative history of Title IX60 to ultimately conclude that Title IX 
prohibits employment discrimination based on sex under any federally-funded 
education program or activity.61 
C.  Sexual Harassment: Definition and Types 
1.  Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment 
One form of sexual harassment is quid pro quo harassment.62 Quid pro quo 
sexual harassment is the classic form of sexual harassment under Title VII.63 Quid 
                                                           
5120 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000). 
52Vanessa H. Eisemann, Protecting the Kids in the Hall: Using Title IX to Stop Student-
on-Student Anti-Gay Harassment, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 125, 128 (2000). 
5320 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
54Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 63 & n.1 (1992). 
55Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979); U.S. Dept. of Just., Title IX Legal 
Manual (2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/ixlegal.htm 
56See, e.g., Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that Title VII is 
the exclusive remedy available for an employee of a federally-funded educational institution 
who alleges sex discrimination). 
57N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 (1982). 
58Id.  
59Id. at 516, 520. 
60Id. at 522. 
6120 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(2000); N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 537. 
62Paula N. Rubin, Civil Rights and Criminal Justice: Primer on Sexual Harassment, in 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: ISSUES AND ANALYSES 1, 3 (Janet V. Lewis ed., 2001). 
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pro quo sexual harassment generally refers to carried-out threats64 by “an individual 
[who] explicitly or implicitly conditions a job, a job benefit, or the absence of a job 
detriment upon an employee’s acceptance of sexual conduct.”65 To be actionable, 
quid pro quo sexual harassment requires that the employee experience an economic 
impact.66 Employers will be subject to liability under a vicarious liability theory if 
the sexual harassment is perpetrated by an individual with control over the victim, 
such as a supervisor. Application of this theory to student-on-teacher sexual 
harassment would be difficult because it would require students to have the power 
and ability to impose economic consequences on their teachers; this is unlikely even 
in schools with the most uninvolved administrations.   
2.  Hostile-Work-Environment Sexual Harassment 
The second form of sexual harassment is hostile-work-environment harassment.67  
Hostile-work-environment sexual harassment refers to “conduct [that] has the 
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance 
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”68 The 
definition of hostile-work-environment sexual harassment applies to harassment that 
occurs in a school, office, or other type of workplace.69 
In order for an individual to have a cause of action for hostile-work-environment 
sexual harassment, the “workplace . . . [must be] permeated with [discrimination] . . . 
that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s 
employment and create an abusive working environment.’”70 Over the years, the 
courts have further clarified what acts may constitute a hostile work environment.  
First, a hostile work environment usually requires more than casual or isolated 
                                                                                                                                         
63Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 663 (D.D.C. 1976) (recognizing, for the first time, 
a cause of action under Title VII for sexual harassment); BELTON, supra note 48, at 443. 
64Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998) (“Cases based on threats which 
are carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo [sic] cases . . . .”). 
65Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994). 
66Rubin, supra note 62, at 3. 
67WEIZER, supra note 44, at 151. This form of sexual harassment is “more problematic” 
for employers. Id. 
68EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2006); 
see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (holding that a hostile work 
environment exists when the “workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, 
ridicule, and insult’ . . . that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank 
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986). 
69Latosha Higgins, Note & Comments, Lack of Knowledge of Sexual Harassment Shields 
School Districts from Employer Liability under Title IX Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 317, 319 (1999) (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County 
Schs., 510 U.S. 60, 75 (1992)). 
70Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (citations omitted). Note that “[s]o long as the environment would 
reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, . . . there is no need for it also 
to be psychologically injurious.” Id. at 22 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 
67 (1986)). 
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incidents.71 Second, hostile-work-environment sexual harassment requires that the 
conduct be “severe or pervasive.”72 Third, a single act alone will generally be 
insufficient to prove the existence of a hostile environment.73 Lastly, the conduct 
must be both subjectively and objectively severe or pervasive such that it alters the 
conditions of employment and creates an abusive working environment.74 
Several characteristics distinguish hostile-work-environment sexual harassment 
from quid pro quo sexual harassment. Unlike quid pro quo sexual harassment, where 
the harasser imposes conditions on the victim’s job in order to receive sexual 
benefits,75 hostile-work-environment sexual harassment refers to harassing conduct 
that creates a work environment for the employee that is so unbearable that it hinders 
the victim’s work performance.76 In addition, hostile-work-environment sexual 
harassment does not require that the victim suffer an economic impact in order to be 
actionable.77  Moreover, the conduct does not have to be sexual in nature78 or even 
directed specifically at the victim so long as the conduct is based on the victim’s sex 
and affects the victim’s ability to perform the job.79 Further, while quid pro quo 
                                                           
71BELTON, supra note 48, at 457. See, e.g., Dawson v. County of Westchester, 373 F.3d 
265, 273 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 926 (9th Cir. 
2000); Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 675 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (holding that single 
proposition was not sufficiently severe to create hostile environment sexual harassment). But 
see Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 812 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that two 
incidents were sufficient to survive summary judgment); Quantock v. Shared Marketing 
Servs., 312 F.3d 899, 905 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that three propositions at the same business 
meeting were sufficiently severe for sexual harassment claim to survive summary judgment). 
72Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an 
objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person 
would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.”). 
73Id.; see also WEIZER, supra note 44, at 157 (“[W]hile no single factor will be a clear 
indication of a hostile environment, a lack of any tangible harm will not by itself sink a sexual 
harassment claim.”). 
74Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an 
objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person 
would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.”). 
75Rubin, supra note 62, at 3. 
76Susan L. Webb, The History of Sexual Harrassment on the Job, in ISSUES AND ANSWERS 
136, 139 (Linda LeMoncheck & James P. Sterba, eds., 2001) (“[H]ostile environment sexual 
harassment, as defined by the courts, is . . . unwelcome and demeaning sexually related 
behavior that creates an intimidating, hostile, and offensive work environment.”) (emphasis 
omitted); see also WEIZER, supra note 44, at 152 (describing hostile environment harassment 
as including a “workplace [that] is so polluted with discrimination that it makes the 
environment of the employment setting hostile or intimidating.”); Rubin, supra note 62, at 4; 
Karen J. Lewis & Jon O. Shimabukuro, Sex Discrimination and the United States Supreme 
Court: Recent Developments in the Law, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: ISSUES AND ANALYSES 82, 
92 (Janet V. Lewis ed., 2001). 
77Rubin, supra note 62, at 4. 
78Id. at 4 (“Hostile work environment harassment . . . can include hostile or offensive 
behavior based on the person’s sex.”). 
79Id. at 5.  
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sexual harassment is limited to supervisors and authority figures,80 hostile-work-
environment sexual harassment may be committed by co-workers or even third 
parties,81 such as students.82   
Courts apply “hostile-work-environment” analysis to sexual harassment claims 
brought under either Title VII or Title IX.83 The courts also employ virtually the 
same sexual harassment definitions to resolve sexual harassment claims brought 
under Title VII or Title IX.84 One distinction, however, is the applicable vicarious 
liability theory. Under Title VII, a negligence standard determines whether an 
employer will be subject to vicarious liability. Under Title IX claims, on the other 
hand, a federally funded school will be subject to vicarious liability if the school 
demonstrated “actual [notice] . . . and . . . deliberate[] indifferen[ce].”85 
3.  Sexual Harassment in School Settings 
The U.S. Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have handed down case 
precedent that confirms the applicability of “hostile-work-environment” analysis to 
the harassment of employees by co-workers or third parties.86 These decisions did 
not specifically involve school employees. The willingness of courts to extend Title 
IX to apply to school employees is just one indication that it will become 
                                                           
80Id. at 4. 
81Id.  
82See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2006).  
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with 
respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or 
its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and 
fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. In reviewing these cases the 
Commission will consider the extent of the employer’s control and any other legal 
responsibility which the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such non-
employees. 
 Id.; Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 183 (D.P.R. 2005) (“[I]t is clear that 
the term ‘non-employee,’ as defined in the EEOC Guidelines, does not exclude students, 
especially if the Court finds that a school has control and legal responsibility over student 
misconduct.”). For further support that, in the instance of student-on-teacher harassment, 
students fall under the classification of third-parties or non-employees, see generally Joanna L. 
Routh, The $100,000 Kiss: What Constitutes Peer Sexual Harassment for Schoolchildren 
Under the Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ. Holding?  28 J.L. & EDUC. 619, 622 (1999) 
(“Students are a non-employee, non-agent third party.”). 
83Vickie J. Brady, Case Note, Borrowing Standards to Fit the Title—Do They 
Really Fit? Title VII Standards Applied in Title IX Educational Sexual Harassment 
Claim as the Conflict Among the Courts Continues. Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. 
Dist., 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996), 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 411, 412 (1998) (“The Kinman 
court clearly borrowed principles and authority from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
to set [the] standard under Title IX.”). 
84U.S. Dept. of Just., supra note 55. 
85Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998); see also 
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). 
86Davis, 526 U.S. 629; Gebser, 524 U.S. 274. 
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increasingly difficult for school districts, as employers, to escape liability for 
student-on-teacher sexual harassment.   
In the context of student-on-teacher sexual harassment, Title VII may protect 
teachers who, as employees, experience a hostile-work-environment created by 
students if the student conduct is so subjectively and objectively severe or pervasive 
that it alters the conditions of employment and creates an abusive working 
environment.87 Similarly, Title IX may subject federally-funded school districts to 
vicarious liability for student-on-teacher sexual harassment because Title IX 
prohibits “discrimination under any education[al] program or activity receiving 
[f]ederal financial assistance.”88  Whether the cause of action is brought under Title 
VII or Title IX, courts will likely use hostile-work-environment sexual harassment 
theory, rather than quid pro quo sexual harassment theory, because hostile work 
environment sexual harassment analysis does not require that the victim suffer an 
economic impact, that the conduct is sexual in nature, or that the conduct is imposed 
by supervisors or authority figures.89  
4. Administrative Guidelines 
In 1980, the EEOC90 established sexual harassment guidelines that apply to 
sexual harassment claims under Title VII.91 The EEOC’s Guidelines92 (“Guidelines”) 
define sexual harassment as “‘[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.’”93 The Guidelines 
prohibit unwelcome sexual advances as a condition for a job benefit.94 In addition, 
the Guidelines prohibit unwelcome conduct with “the purpose or effect of 
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an 
                                                           
87Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993); BELTON, supra note 48, at 455 
(“Harris v. Forklift requires a plaintiff to satisfy both an objective and subjective test in 
proving that sexual harassment was sufficiently ‘severe or pervasive’ to affect ‘the conditions 
of the victim’s employment.’”). 
8820 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000). 
89See supra notes 81-87. 
90The EEOC is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and  
 has five commissioners and a General Counsel appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate . . . . The five-member Commission makes equal employment 
opportunity policy and approves most litigation. The General Counsel is responsible 
for conducting EEOC enforcement litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (Title VII), the Equal Pay Act (EPA), the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  
 EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/commission.html (last visited Jan. 21, 
2006). 
91Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 
(1980). 
9229 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980). 
93Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) 
(1980)). 
9429 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980). 
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intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.'”95  The prohibitions the 
EEOC promulgated in the Guidelines have become an important stepping stone in 
the development of case law interpreting Title VII claims. 
5.  Court Adoption of the EEOC Guidelines 
In the 1980 EEOC Guidelines, the EEOC distinguished between quid pro quo and 
hostile environment sexual harassment. Federal courts relied on these categories of 
sexual harassment in their subsequent interpretation of Title VII. Henson v. City of 
Dundee96 is recognized as one of the first federal circuit cases to adopt the two forms 
of sexual harassment contained in the EEOC Guidelines.97 In Henson, the plaintiff 
brought suit against her supervisor, alleging that his daily inquiries about her and her 
female coworker’s sexual habits created a hostile work environment.98 In holding for 
the plaintiff, the Henson court relied on the EEOC’s Guidelines and identified quid 
pro quo sexual harassment99 and hostile-work-environment sexual harassment100 as 
the two forms that sexual harassment can take. 
                                                           
95Id. 
96Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 
97Id. at 911. 
98Id. at 899. 
99See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (8th ed. 2004) (defining quid pro quo sexual 
harassment as “[s]exual harassment in which the satisfaction of a sexual demand is used as the 
basis of an employment decision.”). Note that the definition of quid pro quo is “something for 
something.” Id. at 1282. For a more detailed discussion of quid pro quo harassment, see, e.g., 
M. David Alexander et al., Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, in 70 THE PRINCIPAL’S 
LEGAL HANDBOOK 317, 319 (Kenneth E. Lane et al. eds., 3d ed. 2005); see also JAMIN B. 
RASKIN, WE THE STUDENTS: SUPREME COURT CASES FOR AND ABOUT STUDENTS 203 (2d ed. 
2003) (explaining quid pro quo harassment in the context of teacher-on-student sexual 
harassment under Title IX); Webb, supra note 76 at 138-39. 
 Quid pro quo (“this for that”) harassment, as defined by the courts, encompasses 
all situations in which submission to sexually harassing conduct is made a term or 
condition of employment or in which submission to or rejection of sexually harassing 
conduct is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting the individual who is 
the target of such conduct.  
 Id. at 138; WEIZER, supra note 44, at 151 (defining quid pro quo harassment as 
“something for something, such as an employer demanding sex in exchange for a job or 
promotion.”); Rubin, supra note 62, at 3 (“Quid pro quo harassment. . . . occurs when an 
employee is required to choose between submitting to sexual advances or losing a tangible job 
benefit.”); Lewis, supra note 76, at 92 (observing that quid pro quo harassment “occurs when 
submission to unwelcome sexual advances or other conduct of a sexual nature is made a 
condition of an individual’s employment or is otherwise used as the basis for employment 
decisions.”). 
100See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (following the 
EEOC guidelines promulgated in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 in holding that sexual harassment is 
established with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment “where an 
employer created or condoned a substantially discriminatory work environment, regardless of 
whether the [plaintiff] lost any tangible job benefits.”). For the definition of hostile-work-
environment harassment see, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (8th ed. 2004) (defining 
hostile-work-environment sexual harassment as “[s]exual harassment in which a work 
environment is created where an employee is subject to unwelcome verbal or physical sexual 
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In 1986, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Meritor Savings 
Bank v. Vinson, which followed Henson and recognized the two types of sexual 
harassment found in the EEOC Guidelines.101 In Meritor, a supervisor at Meritor 
Savings Bank made sexual advances toward Vinson, the plaintiff.102 The Supreme 
Court determined that the focus in any hostile-work-environment harassment claim 
should be “whether [the victim] by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual 
advances were unwelcome.”103 In finding that the supervisor intimidated Vinson into 
having sexual intercourse with him forty to fifty times over a period of four years,104 
the Supreme Court held that “an employee’s coerced participation in a sexual 
relation creates a hostile environment[]”105 and ruled that Vinson had been the victim 
of hostile-work-environment sexual harassment.106 
Over the decades following Meritor, the United States Supreme Court continued 
its struggle to clarify the definitions and appropriate standards to apply to both quid 
pro quo and hostile-work-environment sexual harassment claims.107 Today, most 
courts begin their analysis by identifying the type of sexual harassment at issue. 
Identification is important because quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile-work-
environment sexual harassment require the plaintiff to prove different elements108 to 
establish a prima facie case.109 For both types of sexual harassment claims, courts 
                                                                                                                                         
behavior that is either severe or pervasive.”); Alexander, supra note 99, at 319; RASKIN, supra 
note 99, at 203 (applying the definition of hostile-work-environment to teacher-on-student 
harassment under Title IX); Webb, supra note 76, at 139; WEIZER, supra note 44, at 152; 
Rubin, supra note 62, at 4; Lewis, supra note 76, at 92. 
101Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see also Alexander, supra note 99, at 
319. 
102Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60. 
103Id. at 68. 
104Id. at 60. 
105Alexander, supra note 99, at 319. 
106Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. 
107Id. at 65. Note that the definition of sexual harassment in Title VII is borrowed by 
courts in interpreting other statutes, such as Title IX. Brady, supra note 83, at 412. 
108In a hostile-work-environment case, the plaintiff must prove that “the conduct was 
unwelcome[,] . . . was severe, pervasive, and regarded by the claimant as so hostile or 
offensive as to alter his or her conditions of employment . . . [and] was such that a reasonable 
person would find it hostile or offensive.” Rubin, supra note 62, at 5. Alternatively, proving 
quid pro quo harassment requires that “[t]he harassment was based on sex . . . [and] [t]he 
claimant was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances.” Id. at 3-4. Note that the former 
requirement that the plaintiff also suffer “loss of a tangible job benefit” became inoperative 
after Meritor.  Id. at 4; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57-58. 
109Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982) (establishing the 
elements of a prima facie case for a hostile work environment claim). The Henson court 
defined the elements as:  
 (1) [t]he employee belongs to a protected [class]. . .  [;] (2) [t]he employee was 
subject[ed] to unwelcome sexual harassment . . .[;] (3) [t]he harassment was based 
[on] sex . . .[;] (4) [t]he harassment . . . affected a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of 
employment . . .[; and] (5) [that the doctrine of] [r]espondeat superior [applies]. 
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will decide whether the defendant’s conduct was unwelcome110 and will examine the 
“‘totality of the circumstances[]’”111 to determine whether or not sexual harassment 
occurred.112  
D. Sexual Harassment Laws: Application to Student-on-Teacher Harassment 
Although Title VII is meant to protect all employees from workplace 
harassment,113 many courts still refuse to recognize a cause of action under Title VII 
by teachers sexually harassed by their students. Only recently have any courts been 
willing to recognize that a harassed teacher, as a school employee, may have a valid 
cause of action under Title VII against the school for its failure to intervene to 
protect its employees from student harassment.114 As a result, schools often remain 
free from legal liability,115 even though courts readily impose vicarious liability on 
employers in non-school contexts for sexual harassment of employees by non-
employees.116 Given that courts have extended the application of Title VII to apply to 
all employers in order to meet fully the statute’s purpose,117 schools face an increased 
risk of liability for failing to act when students harass their teachers.  
The United States Supreme Court has held employers liable under Title VII for 
most sexual harassment that arises in the workplace, including harassment by 
individuals in non-supervisory positions. For example, the Supreme Court has 
recognized employer liability for co-worker harassment.118 When claims arise based 
                                                                                                                                         
 Id. See BELTON, supra note 48, at 453. The focus of this Note, school district 
liability for student-on-teacher sexual harassment, requires analysis under hostile-work-
environment sexual harassment.  
110Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 468 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Meritor); see also BELTON, supra note 48, at 453. 
111Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)). 
112EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (2006); 
see Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998) (reaffirming the importance of focusing on the “surrounding 
circumstances, expectations, and relationships”); Williams v. Gen. Motors, Corp., 187 F.3d 
553, 562 (6th Cir. 1999) (using the “totality of the circumstances” term of art that the EEOC 
introduced). 
113Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 180 (D.P.R. 2005). 
114Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that, 
although the former teacher brought his claim under § 1983, the school district could be liable 
to plaintiff under a negligence theory if the claim had been brought under Title VII).  Note that 
in this case the students subjected Schroeder to harassment based on his sexual orientation. Id. 
at 948. 
115Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 180 (noting that the United States Supreme Court has 
not directly ruled on this issue).  
116See, e.g., Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1027-28 (D. Nev. 
1992). 
117Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 180. 
118Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 776 (1998) (“[T]he lower courts, [have] 
uniformly judg[ed] employer liability for co-worker harassment under a negligence standard . . 
. .”). But see Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir. 1988) (indicating that the 
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on co-worker-on-employee sexual harassment, courts apply the negligence standard 
to determine whether the employer should be held liable.119 Further, although the 
United States Supreme Court has not directly ruled on employer liability for 
harassment of employees by non-employees, the lower federal courts have 
recognized a cause of action under Title VII for non-employee-on-employee sexual 
harassment,120 such as sexual harassment of an employee by a customer.121 These 
courts have uniformly applied the negligence standard to determine an employer’s 
liability under Title VII for non-employee-on-employee sexual harassment.122  
Further, the EEOC Guidelines have designated the negligence standard as the 
appropriate standard by which to establish employer liability for sexual harassment 
of employees by non-employees.123 
III.  WHERE WE ARE TODAY 
The United States Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the issue of school 
district liability for student-on-teacher sexual harassment.124 There has not been a 
direct ruling on this issue by the lower federal courts either.125 Even so, schools 
should be aware that, in light of recent case law, the Supreme Court could recognize 
such a claim.   
Given the present uncertainty in the law, school districts do not have a clear 
understanding of the extent of their legal responsibility, if any, to intervene when a 
teacher is sexually harassed by students. As a result, many schools exert minimal 
effort to prevent or stop this form of sexual harassment.126 Based on recent court 
                                                                                                                                         
appropriate standard under Title IX is deliberate indifference). Note, however, that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has not directly ruled on employer liability for co-worker-on-employee sexual 
harassment. 
119Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799-800. The negligence standard is applied to co-worker 
harassment claims instead of the vicarious liability standard on the rationale that employers do 
not give co-workers as much control over the harassed employee as supervisors. Id.   
120See, e.g., Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 854 (1st Cir. 1998); 
Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 181. 
121Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998). 
122See Rodriguez-Hernandez, 132 F.3d at 854.   
 [A]n employer is held responsible for “the acts of sexual harassment towards his 
employees in the workplace by persons not employed by him if the employer or his 
agents or supervisors knew or should have known of such conduct and did not take 
immediate and adequate action to correct the situation.”   
 Id. (quoting P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 155f (1995)); see also Plaza-Torres, 376 F. 
Supp. 2d at 181; Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1073; Erickson v. Wis. Dept. of Corr., 358 F. Supp. 2d 
709, 726 (W.D.Wis. 2005). 
123EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2006). 
124See Mark Walsh, High Court Declines Case on Harassment of Gay Teacher, 22 EDUC. 
WK., Oct. 30, 2002, at 28 (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari for a claim 
of student-on-teacher sexual orientation harassment). 
125Lannon, supra note 11. 
126Chamberlain, supra note 38, at 32; see also Alan Dessoff, Harassed Teacher Wins in 
Court of Last Resort, 40 DISTRICT ADMIN. 50 available at http://www.district 
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treatment of this and related issues, however, school districts might not remain 
liability-free for long. Recent decisions suggest that courts may be willing to extend 
both Title VII and Title IX to allow teachers to bring lawsuits against their schools 
for student-on-teacher sexual harassment. To avoid costly litigation, school districts 
should become familiar with the decisions that suggest the potential for liability for 
student-on-teacher sexual harassment and pay particular attention to the standard 
under which they may become liable. 
Schools may soon be subject to liability under Title VII or Title IX for failure to 
intervene in incidences of student-on-teacher sexual harassment.127 As discussed 
earlier, Title VII is a federal statute that applies to all employers with fifteen or more 
employees to prohibit sex discrimination in the workplace.128 School liability for 
student-on-teacher sexual harassment may arise under Title VII based on the 
willingness of courts to recognize an employee’s cause of action against an employer 
for sexual harassment by an individual who is not employed by the defendant 
employer.129 Additionally, schools may become subject to liability for student-on-
teacher sexual harassment under Title IX, a federal statute that prohibits sex 
discrimination under federally-funded school programs and activities,130 based on the 
United States Supreme Court’s recognition of school liability under Title IX for both 
teacher-on-student and student-on-student sexual harassment.131   
A.  Employers May Be Liable for Non-Employee-on-Employee Sexual Harassment 
Employers may be liable under Title VII for failing to intervene in incidences of 
hostile-work-environment sexual harassment perpetrated by non-employees against  
employees.132 The EEOC Guidelines recognize employer liability in this situation if 
the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take 
appropriate action to prevent or correct it.133  To determine the appropriateness of 
                                                                                                                                         
administration.com/viewarticle.aspx?articleid=597 (recognizing the abuse that teachers endure 
by reporting the experience of a teacher who filed suit because her school administration tried 
to minimize the situation and refused to take action to prevent her continued harassment by 
students).  
127Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 180 (D.P.R. 2005). 
128Id.; see also Weiner, supra note 47, at 189.   
129See, e.g., Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1073 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[A]n 
employer may be found liable for the harassing conduct of its customers.”); see also Turnbull 
v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that the plaintiff doctor had a 
cause of action against her employer hospital for sexual harassment committed by a patient). 
130See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000). 
131Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (student-on-student 
harassment); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (teacher-on-student 
harassment). 
132See generally Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, Sexual Harassment of 
Employees by Non-employees: When Does the Employer Become Liable? 21 PEPP. L. REV. 
447 (1994). 
133EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2006) 
(“An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with respect to sexual 
harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its agents or supervisory 
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imposing liability, the EEOC Guidelines recommend an inquiry into the employer’s 
level of control or legal responsibility over the non-employee.134 
When the lower federal courts first began ruling on employer liability for the 
harassment of employees by non-employees, they followed the EEOC Guidelines to 
determine whether the employer should be held liable for the actions of non-
employees.  For example, in Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp.,135 the District Court 
relied on the EEOC Guidelines136 to hold, in a case of first impression, that a casino 
could be held liable under Title VII for the sexual harassment of a dealer by 
gamblers “in the appropriate case.”137 The circuit courts quickly followed the district 
court’s lead and adopted the EEOC’s formulation for handling this issue.  For 
example, in Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc.,138 the Tenth Circuit held that an employer 
could be liable for negligently ignoring a waitress’s complaints of harassment from 
her customers.139 
Over the years, the circuit courts began to emphasize the level of control or legal 
responsibility that the employer had over the non-employee and the work 
environment when determining whether to impute liability.140 In Crist v. Focus 
Homes, Inc.,141 employees who worked at a private residential facility for autistic 
individuals were assaulted by their patients.142 In holding that the employer failed to 
properly respond, the Eighth Circuit focused on the employer’s ability to control the 
environment to determine the appropriateness of finding the employer liable for the 
harassment.143  Also, in Turnbull v. Topeka State Hospital,144 the Tenth Circuit 
emphasized the employer’s control over the work environment to hold the state 
mental hospital liable for the sexual assault of a psychologist by a patient.145 
Today, an employer may be held vicariously liable for a hostile-work-
environment created by non-employees if the employer had the requisite level of 
                                                                                                                                         
employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and 
appropriate corrective action.”). 
134Id. 
135841 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Nev. 1992). Note that the court was ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment. Id. at 1025. 
136Id. at 1027-28. 
137Id. at 1028.  
138162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998). 
139Id. at 1072. 
140Undoubtedly, this is also in reliance on the EEOC Guidelines. 29 CFR § 1604.11(e) 
(1985) (“In reviewing these cases the Commission will consider the extent of the employer's 
control and any other legal responsibility which the employer may have with respect to the 
conduct of such non-employees.”). 
141122 F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 1997). 
142Id. at 1108. 
143Id. at 1112. 
144255 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2001). 
145Id. at 1244. 
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control or legal responsibility over the non-employee and failed to act “in accordance 
with its statutory duty not to discriminate in the workplace.”146  The negligence 
standard remains the accepted standard by which courts determine whether or not the 
employer should be held liable under Title VII for failing to prevent sexual 
harassment of its employees by non-employees.147  Indeed, “the focus in a ‘failure to 
prevent’ situation . . . should be on the employer’s knowledge of the harassment, the 
employer’s ability to end or prevent it and the “adequacy of the employer’s remedial 
and preventative responses.”148   
Courts readily apply Title VII’s prohibition against sexual harassment in the 
workplace to protect school employees.149 For example, courts recognize that Title 
VII protects school employees against harassment by a coworker150 or supervisor.151  
As discussed earlier, Title VII applies to all employers, whether public or private, to 
ensure that employees are protected against various forms of discrimination, 
including sex discrimination,152 no matter the perpetrator.153 In fact, courts have now 
begun to extend Title VII to impose a duty on schools to protect all of their 
employees, including teachers, from harassment by non-employees, such as 
students.154 As a result, school districts should anticipate eventual uniform extension 
of Title VII to school liability for student-on-teacher sexual harassment.   
B. Schools May Be Liable for Teacher-on-Student Sexual Harassment  
Under Title IX, schools may be held liable for teacher-on-student sexual 
harassment.  In 1998, the United States Supreme Court recognized the importance of 
imposing liability on a school for failing to prevent or respond to harassment of 
students by teachers when it decided Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School 
District.155  In Gebser, a high school teacher, Frank Waldrop, in the Lago Vista 
                                                           
146Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1020 (5th Cir. 1996). 
147See Erickson v. Wis. Dept. of Corr., 358 F. Supp. 2d 709, 727 (W.D. Wis. 2005) 
(“[D]efendant’s liability for failing to prevent plaintiff from being sexually harassed should be 
governed by the negligence standard . . . .”). 
148Id. (quoting Turnbull, 255 F.3d at 1244). 
149See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 (1982). 
150Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998) (recognizing uniform 
treatment by the lower courts of co-worker-on-employee harassment under the negligence 
standard of liability). 
151Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 
780 (holding that an employer is vicariously liable for sexual harassment of an employee by a 
supervisor).  Further, the Faragher court recognized the employer’s affirmative defenses that 
it acted reasonably and the employee acted unreasonably if the harassment did not create a 
tangible employment action. Id. at 807. 
152Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
153Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982) (indicating that the 
actions of supervisors, coworkers, “or even strangers to the workplace” can create a hostile 
environment for an employee). 
154Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 180 (D.P.R. 2005). 
155Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
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Independent School District made sexually suggestive comments to students in his 
book discussion group.156  Mr. Waldrop began directing these comments specifically 
to the plaintiff, an eighth-grader who joined the teacher’s book discussion group.157 
Mr. Waldrop eventually initiated sexual contact with the student, and ultimately 
engaged in sexual intercourse with her over a period of months.158 The student failed 
to report the teacher’s inappropriate conduct to school officials, and the contact 
continued until the two were caught by a police officer.159  When the student brought 
suit under Title IX against the school district, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized that a cause of action could arise in this situation, but that school officials 
with authority to end the sexual harassment must have actual notice of the 
harassment and act with deliberate indifference before the school would be held 
liable for the teacher’s harassing conduct.160 
C.  Schools May Be Liable for Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment 
Under Title IX, schools may be held liable for student-on-student sexual 
harassment as well. Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court held that a school could be 
liable for teacher-on-student harassment in certain circumstances, it held that a 
school could be liable for student-on-student sexual harassment. In Davis v. Monroe 
County Board of Education,161 fifth-grader LaShonda Davis endured sexually 
harassing comments from one of her peers over a period of five months.162 Despite 
the efforts of LaShonda and her mom to notify teachers and school officials of the 
inappropriate behavior, the school never disciplined the other student.163 The 
Supreme Court ruled that the school district would be liable for the sexual 
harassment of LaShonda by her peer only if “the funding recipient acts with 
deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment . . . that [are] so severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive that [they] effectively bar[] the victim’s access 
to an educational opportunity or benefit.”164 As in Gebser,165 the Supreme Court held 
                                                           
156Id. at 277-78. 
157Id.  
158Id. at 278. 
159Id.  
160Id. at 290.  
 [A] damages remedy will not lie under Title IX unless an official who at a 
minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective 
measures on the recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the 
recipient’s programs and fails to adequately respond.  
 . . . [M]oreover . . . the response must amount to deliberate indifference to 
discrimination. 
 Id. 
161Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).  
162Id. at 633-34. 
163Id, 
164Id. at 633. 
165Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
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in Davis that a school is liable for student-on-student sexual harassment if it knew 
about the harassment and acted with deliberate indifference.166 In its decision, the 
Supreme Court imposed a duty on schools to take appropriate remedial action to 
promptly  stop sexual harassment among students.167 
D.  Schools May Be Liable for Student-on-Teacher Harassment 
Teachers bringing sexual harassment claims based on harassment by students 
have struggled to overcome certain obstacles. In one case, a school was not held 
liable because it took prompt remedial action to end the harassment of the teacher by 
students.168 In doing so, the court found that the school district demonstrated that it 
did not act unreasonably by either negligently refusing to protect its teachers169 or by 
acting with deliberate indifference to known instances of student harassment of 
teachers.170 In another case, the court held that the school was not liable because the 
harassing conduct perpetrated by the students did not rise to a level sufficient to 
constitute hostile-work-environment sexual harassment.171 
Recently, the District Court of Puerto Rico denied summary judgment to the 
defendants in a student-on-teacher sexual harassment claim brought under Title VII. 
The plaintiff, Henar Plaza-Torres, was a school teacher at Petra Roman Vigo School 
from October 2000 until February 2001.172 Two students, Johnny Davila and Angel 
Vera, made sexually suggestive comments to Ms. Plaza-Torres.173 Ms. Plaza-Torres 
began reporting the harassing conduct to Ms. Evelyn Matos, the Mathematics 
Supervisor for the school district, in November or December of 2000, and met with 
the Discipline Committee to discuss Johnny Davila’s conduct.174 Nevertheless, the 
harassment continued with no intervention by the school district.175  In February of 
2001, Ms. Plaza-Torres resigned, and stated that she felt intimidated by the students’ 
comments.176 On August 8, 2001, Ms. Plaza-Torres filed a charge of discrimination 
with the EEOC to bring a Title VII sexual harassment claim against the former 
                                                           
166Davis, 526 U.S. at 633. Specifically, the court held that a school may be liable under 
Title IX for student-on-student sexual harassment if the school “acts with deliberate 
indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or activities . . . [and the] harassment 
. . . is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access 
to an educational opportunity or benefit.” Id.  
167Id. 
168See, e.g., Warnock v. Archer, 380 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that the 
school district took the requisite prompt remedial action to avoid liability for student-on-
teacher harassment). 
169Recall that this is the Title VII standard. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
170Recall that this is the Title IX standard. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
171See, e.g., Seils v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 192 F. Supp. 2d 100 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). 
172Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 177 (D.P.R. 2005). 
173Id.  
174Id.  
175Id. at 175. 
176Id. at 177. 
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Secretary of the Department of Education, as well as the School Director of Petra 
Roman Vigo School, the Department of Education, and the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico.177 
Although the ruling of the United States District Court of Puerto Rico is not 
binding on other jurisdictions, its reasoning may be useful to other courts faced with 
the issue of student-on-teacher sexual harassment. In denying defendants’ motions 
for summary judgment, the Plaza-Torres court acknowledged that “neither the U.S. 
Supreme Court nor the First Circuit Court have discussed school liability for sexual 
harassment suffered by a teacher on account of a student.”178 The court then 
concluded that “a cause of action for student-on-teacher sexual harassment may be 
inferred from recent Title VII, Equal Protection and Title IX case law.”179   
1.  Plaza-Torres Analysis 
Plaza-Torres v. Rey180 provided the United States District Court of Puerto Rico 
with the first opportunity to address the issue of school liability for student-on-
teacher sexual harassment.181 In July of 2005, the District Court denied the 
defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and held that an “employee of an 
educational institution, who has suffered sex discrimination [during] employment, 
may file a cause of action under Title VII or Title IX.”182  This holding means that 
teachers, as employees of an educational institution, may bring a cause of action 
against their school district under either Title VII or Title IX for sexual harassment, a 
form of sex discrimination,183 perpetrated by students. The court proceeded to 
analyze the case under Title VII, the statutory basis asserted by the plaintiff.184 The 
court reasoned that Title VII’s prohibition against “unlawful employment practices, 
based upon a person’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin[,]”185 applies to all 
employers, including schools.186 In dicta, the court carefully considered 
congressional intent and concluded that Title IX’s prohibition against discrimination 
by any educational program or activity receiving federal funds covers employment 
                                                           
177Id. at 175, 177. 
178Id. at 180. 
179Id.  
180Id. at 171. 
181Alex Londono, Costly Crushes: Student-on-Teacher Sexual Harassment, EDUC. LAB. 
LETTER, Nov. 2005, at 4, available at http://laborlawyers.com/showarticle. 
aspx?Type=1119&ArticleType=-1&NewsLetterType=3388&Show=3954. 
182Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 180.  
183EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2006); 
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (“[I]n 1980[,] the EEOC issued 
Guidelines specifying that ‘sexual harassment’ . . . is a form of sex discrimination prohibited 
by Title VII.”). 
184Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 179-80, 180 & n.3. 
185Id. at 178 (citing Provencher v. CVS Pharm., 145 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir. 1998)).  
186Id. at 179. 
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discrimination, such as sexual harassment, by educational institutions receiving 
federal funds.187 
In Plaza-Torres,188 the District Court also determined the standard for assessing 
school district liability for student-on-teacher sexual harassment claims brought 
under Title VII. To reach the proper standard, the district court reviewed the law 
governing supervisor-on-employee,189 co-worker-on-employee,190 and non-
employee-on-employee191 sexual harassment claims and ultimately held that the 
negligence standard that courts apply to non-employee-on-employee sexual 
harassment claims would be the appropriate standard to apply to student-on-teacher 
sexual harassment claims brought under Title VII.192   
The Plaza-Torres court provided persuasive support for its decision to adopt the 
negligence standard to resolve the issue of school liability for student-on-teacher 
sexual harassment. The court relied in part on the standard adopted by Peries v. New 
York City Board of Education,193 in which a teacher’s Title VII claim against the 
school district for harassment by students based on race and national origin survived 
summary judgment.194 Relying on prior relevant case law that had addressed 
employer liability for harassment of employees in non-school settings, the Peries 
court concluded that “it is difficult to conceive of a test more appropriate for student-
on-teacher harassment than that suggested for customer harassment.”195  Customer-
on-employee, or non-employee-on-employee, harassment uses the negligence 
standard to determine whether to impose liability on the employer.196   
The court relied on the general rule that “[a]n employer’s liability for hostile 
[work] environment sexual harassment depends on the relationship between the 
employer and the person responsible for the sexual harassment.”197 The Plaza-Torres 
court applied this general rule to the situation of student-on-teacher sexual 
                                                           
187Id. at 180; see also N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 520-21 (1982); Davis 
v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (interpreting Title IX as a prohibition of 
hostile-work-environment harassment in cases involving employees of educational 
institutions).  
188Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 171. 
189Id. at 181. 
190Id.  
191Id.  
192Id. at 183. 
193Peries v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. 97 CV 7109, 2001 WL 1328921 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 
6, 2001).  
194Id. at *5-6. 
195Id. at *6.  
196Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 
1604.11(e)).  
197Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 183 (citing Molina Quintero v. Caribe G.E. Power 
Breakers, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 108, 112 (D.P.R. 2002)); see also Molina Quintero, F. Supp. 
2d at 112. For a discussion of the relationship between the employer and the harasser in terms 
of the agency relationship, see, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
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harassment and determined that resolution of the issue of school liability for student-
on-teacher sexual harassment necessarily requires that fact finders look at the 
relationship between the school officials and the student or students responsible for 
the sexual harassment.198 Hence, the Plaza-Torres court clarifies that fact finders 
should look at the relationship between the school officials and the students to 
determine the school’s level of control over the students responsible for the sexual 
harassment of its employees.199 
Although the Plaza-Torres court specified negligence as the appropriate standard 
for determining whether a school district should be held liable, as an employer, for 
failing to prevent student-on-teacher sexual harassment under Title VII, it did not 
address the appropriate standard for resolving the issue under Title IX.200 The 
standard for determining a school’s liability for student-on-teacher sexual harassment 
under Title IX likely differs from the Title VII standard. Had the court considered 
this issue, it likely would have concluded that the school must have had actual notice 
of the harassment201 and acted “deliberately indifferent”202 to be subject to liability. 
Relevant case law has ruled that, in order to establish school liability for the 
harassing conduct of its students or teachers under Title IX, the school must have had 
actual notice of the harassment203 and acted “deliberately indifferent.”204 While 
Plaza-Torres is not binding on other jurisdictions of the United States,205 as the most 
recent case on point, this decision is instructive to school districts seeking to 
understand their legal responsibility and avoid potential liability. 
2.  Policy Considerations 
Courts often rely on policy considerations when deciding questions of law. There 
are strong policy rationales for imposing liability on schools for student-on-teacher 
sexual harassment, including the public interest in school safety, teacher safety, and 
order in the classroom. Further, the government has a strong interest in preventing an 
“unpleasant, unproductive work atmosphere.”206 The disruption that student-on-
                                                           
198Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 183. 
199Id.  
200Id. at 180 (“Plaintiff s[ought] relief under Title VII[] . . . .”). 
201Id. at 183; Peries v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. 97 CV 7109, 2001 WL 1328921, at *6 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2001); Lipsett v. Univ. of P. R., 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988). 
202See Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 953 (7th Cir. 2002). 
203Plaza Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 183; Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 901. 
204Schroeder, 282 F.3d at 951 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 
454 (7th Cir. 1996), in holding that, to survive summary judgment, plaintiff “must show that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants ‘acted either intentionally 
or with deliberate indifference’”). 
205HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 10 (rev. 4th ed. 2003) 
(“Precedent becomes ‘binding authority’ on a court if the precedent case was decided by that 
court or a higher court in the same jurisdiction.”) In addition, “[t]he decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States are binding on all courts in all jurisdictions for matters of 
constitutional and other federal law.” Id. at 12. 
206Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 691 (1979). 
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teacher sexual harassment creates should motivate schools to take action to prevent 
and correct student-on-teacher harassment.  
Student-on-teacher sexual harassment has far-reaching effects. It is upsetting to 
the victims who must endure the treatment as part of the work environment. Other 
students also suffer because a victimized teacher is unable to teach as effectively as a 
teacher in a harassment-free environment.207 The students who remain free to harass 
their teachers may not learn to treat authority figures with respect. Student-on-
teacher sexual harassment is a distraction to students in the United States schools. 
Without proper intervention now, student-on-teacher sexual harassment will further 
impair our nation’s ability to educate its young people effectively. 
School officials with the power to control the behavior of students should 
intervene to stop student-on-teacher sexual harassment. Courts already realize that 
“as a general rule, school administrators and school board officials have disciplinary 
authority that exceeds that of a classroom teacher.”208  School officials have the 
power to use their heightened authority to impose disciplinary sanctions to stop the 
behavior of student harassers and set an example for other students, thereby creating 
safer schools overall.209   
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are made to school boards in anticipation of 
increased court willingness to extend precedent and impose liability on schools for 
student-on-teacher sexual harassment. School districts should revise their current 
anti-harassment policies to explicitly prohibit student-on-teacher sexual harassment, 
establish effective complaint procedures to help victims report incidents of sexual 
harassment, and develop training programs to educate the entire school community 
on the school’s stance against sexual harassment.210 In addition, states should adopt 
legislation to mandate that school policies include a clear prohibition specifically 
directed against student-on-teacher sexual harassment. 
A. Revise School Anti-Harassment Policies 
Currently, many school districts fail to include student-on-teacher sexual 
harassment in their anti-harassment policies. The EEOC Guidelines recommend that 
all employers “take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, 
such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing 
appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise 
                                                           
207See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (“Without first establishing 
discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students.”). 
208Peries v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. 97 CV 7109, 2001 WL 1328921, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 6, 2001) (recognizing that school officials have heightened authority over students as 
compared to the authority of classroom teachers); see also Howard v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Sycamore Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 893 F.Supp. 808, 819 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (“[T]he principal, is in 
a unique position to . . . control the behavior of students. . . . [H]e has a responsibility to the 
teachers . . . in his role as chief administrator of the school.”). 
209See The Principals’ Partnership, Research Brief: Teacher Intimidation by Students, 
http://www.principalspartnership.com/teacherintimidation.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). 
210Inspired by the National Education Association, http://www.nea.org/he/ 
resolution/heres-I51.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2006). 
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the issue of harassment under title VII [sic], and developing methods to sensitize all 
concerned.”211 Studies show that anti-harassment policies are effective at reducing 
the incidents of student harassment of teachers.212 Since courts look to the EEOC 
Guidelines to determine employer liability,213 schools should establish anti-
harassment policies with prohibitions against all forms of sexual harassment.214   
The new policies that schools adopt should include clear prohibitions against 
sexual harassment of teachers by students. To comply with the EEOC’s 
recommendations, schools that rely on model policies created by governmental 
entities need to be careful to ensure that the model policy reflects a strong stance 
against student-on-teacher sexual harassment. Some model policies fail to do so. For 
example, the Department of Education provided an Arizona Sample Policy, prepared 
by the Office of the Attorney General, which provided that “[i]t shall be a violation 
of District policy for any student, teacher, administrator, or other school personnel of 
this District to harass a student through conduct of a sexual nature, or regarding race, 
color, national origin or disability, as defined by this policy.”215 This policy is 
problematic today, in light of the implications of Plaza-Torres,216 because it fails to 
ban harassment of teachers and other school employees by students. Schools can 
increase the effectiveness of their anti-harassment policies in several ways. First, 
schools can modify the language of the policy so it resembles the language of the 
Minnesota Sample School Board Policy: 
It shall be a violation of this policy for any pupil, teacher, administrator or 
other school personnel of the School District to harass a pupil, teacher, 
administrator or other school personnel through conduct or 
communication of a sexual nature or regarding religion and race as 
defined by this policy. (For purposes of this policy, school personnel 
includes school board members, school employees, agents, volunteers, 
                                                           
211EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (2006); 
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Policy Guidance on Current Issues of 
Sexual Harassment, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/currentissues.html (last visited Feb. 12, 
2006). 
212See The Principals’ Partnership, supra note 209. 
213Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 
429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)). 
214AM. ASS’N. OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND. SEXUAL HARASSMENT TASK FORCE, 
HARASSMENT-FREE HALLWAYS: HOW TO STOP SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOL: A GUIDE FOR 
STUDENTS, PARENTS, AND SCHOOLS 22 (Susan K. Dyer ed., 2004), available at 
http://www.aauw.org/research/upload/completeguide.pdf. [hereinafter SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
TASK FORCE] . 
215Department of Education, Protecting Students from Harassment and Hate Crime: A 
Guide for Schools – January 1999 Appendix A: Sample School Policies 57, available at 
http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/archives/pdf/AppA.pdf (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
Appendix A]. 
216See Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171 (D.P.R. 2005). 
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contractors or persons subject to the supervision and control of the 
District.)217 
Second, schools should include in the anti-harassment policy specific complaint 
procedures available to victims. These complaint procedures should outline the 
process of investigation that the school will follow upon receipt of a complaint and 
specify clear expectations as well as disciplinary consequences for perpetrators.218 
Finally, schools should place the anti-harassment policy in the school handbook to 
assure distribution of the policy to students, parents, school employees, and other 
members of the school community.   
B.  Develop Proactive Training Programs for School Communities 
Establishing clear anti-harassment provisions that prohibit student-on-teacher 
sexual harassment is important, but is usually not enough. School districts must 
“spur changes in behavior and not just policy[]”219 by developing proactive training 
programs for the entire school community. Some schools already use training 
programs to address other common school problems. For example, the Steps to 
Respect bullying-prevention program,220 Bully Busters,221 and the Olweus Bully 
Prevention Program model222 address bullying behavior. Similarly, the Second Step 
violence-prevention program223 deals with violence. Schools can adapt these or 
similar programs to specifically address sexual harassment of teachers by students.   
C.  State Legislation 
Some states have enacted laws that require school districts to adopt anti-sexual 
harassment policies.224 For example, North Carolina passed legislation, effective July 
                                                           
217Appendix A, supra note 215, at 63 (providing the Minnesota Sample School Board 
Policy Prohibiting Harassment and Violence, as prepared by the Minnesota School Boards 
Association).  
218See SEXUAL HARASSMENT TASK FORCE, supra note 214, at 17-19. 
219AM. ASS’N. OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS: BULLYING, 
TEASING, AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOL 44 (Jodi Lipson ed., 2001), available at 
http://www.aauw.org/research/upload/hostilehallways.pdf. 
220Committee for Children Homepage, http://www.cfchildren.org/cfc/strf/str/strindex (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2006). 
221Bully Busters, http://www.bullybusters.org (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). 
222Olweus Bullying Prevention Program, http://www.clemson.edu/olweus (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2006). 
223Committee for Children Homepage, http://www.cfchildren.org/cfc/ssf/ssf/ssindex (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2006). 
224See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-15-1005(b)(1) (West 2005); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 231.5 
(West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-32-109.1 (West 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17: 
416.13 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1300a (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
121A.03 (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 37-15 (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, 
§ 24-100.4 (West 2005); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 339.356 (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-
21-26 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1016 (West 2006); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.083 
(Vernon 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 166 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.300.285 
(West 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2C-3 (West 2007).  
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1, 2001, to address harassment of school employees.225 The statute provides that 
“[e]ach local board of education may adopt a policy addressing the sexual 
harassment of . . . employees by students.”226 To afford school employees necessary 
protection, all state legislatures should follow the example of North Carolina. For 
even greater protection, legislation should mandate adoption of such a policy, instead 
of merely allowing for its adoption. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Students often test the boundaries of appropriate behavior. Disorder ensues in the 
schools when authority figures refuse to correct student misbehavior. Schools should 
not be complacent about this problem. Recent cases suggest that courts are 
increasingly willing to hold schools liable for student-on-teacher harassment.   
Student-on-teacher sexual harassment has a devastating impact on teachers, other 
students, and society that will continue until school administrators with the power to 
stop the harassment take action to do so. School districts should anticipate legal 
liability and adopt proactive policies and programs to prevent and correct all forms 
of sexual harassment, including student-on-teacher sexual harassment. 
 
                                                           
225 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C-335.5 (West 2005). 
226 Id. § 115C - 335.5. 
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